MultiversX brought its mainnet back online on September 24 after halting the chain to contain an exploit, according to reporting from CryptoSlate. Block production resumed, but the return to normal is only partial: Kraken kept EGLD in a restricted state, leaving trading cancel-only rather than reopening the market.
The split between a functioning chain and a cautious exchange is the real story here. A network can technically recover in hours. The confidence of the venues that list its token recovers on a slower clock.
A deliberate halt, then a restart
Stopping block production is one of the more drastic tools a proof-of-stake network has. It freezes everything: transfers, trades that settle on-chain, contract calls, deposits, and withdrawals. Validators coordinate to pause rather than let an active exploit keep draining value or corrupting state while a fix is prepared.
MultiversX chose that route, and the chain sat halted until the September 24 restart returned it to producing blocks. The mechanics of a coordinated halt mean recovery is not a single switch. Validators have to agree on the state to resume from, patched node software has to propagate, and the network has to confirm blocks are finalizing cleanly before anyone treats it as fully operational again.
At the time of writing, the primary source confirms blocks resumed but does not detail the full scope of losses or the exact exploit vector. We are not going to fill that gap with numbers that have not been reported.
Kraken's cancel-only stance
The more telling signal came from Kraken. Rather than flip EGLD trading back on alongside the mainnet restart, the exchange kept the pair in a cancel-only state, meaning users could pull existing orders but not place new ones.
Cancel-only is a middle setting between fully live and fully suspended. It lets an exchange freeze new market activity while the operational picture is still uncertain, without trapping users in open positions they cannot exit. Exchanges reach for it when they want to protect customers from trading into a market whose settlement layer they do not yet trust.
That gap matters. The MultiversX network declaring itself back does not automatically restore an exchange's willingness to process deposits and withdrawals for the token. Kraken runs its own risk assessment. Until its team is satisfied that on-chain settlement is safe and balances reconcile, it can keep the token restricted regardless of what the chain's block explorer shows.
The recovery is only as complete as its slowest gatekeeper
For an EGLD holder, this is the practical takeaway: the asset lives on a chain that is running again, but access to it depends on where it sits. Tokens on the live network move under the restart's rules. Tokens on Kraken sit behind the exchange's cancel-only wall until the exchange lifts it.
This is a recurring pattern after any chain incident. Custody location decides your options during the messy middle. Funds you control on-chain follow the network's status. Funds on a centralized venue follow that venue's risk desk, which is usually more conservative than the protocol team announcing the all-clear. This is one of the concrete arguments for holding assets in self-custody wallets rather than leaving spendable balances on an exchange: an exchange freeze does not touch a wallet whose keys you hold, though it also means you carry the responsibility for security yourself.
None of this is a verdict on MultiversX's long-term health. A halt-and-restart is a defensive tool working as designed, not proof the protocol is broken. But the sequence is a reminder that "the network is back" and "you can freely trade the token" are two separate milestones, and the second one is set by the exchanges, not the chain.
Overview
MultiversX resumed mainnet block production on September 24 after halting the chain to contain an exploit. Kraken did not follow with a full reopening, keeping EGLD trading cancel-only. The divergence highlights that a network's technical recovery and an exchange's willingness to trade its token are independent events, and that custody location determines what a holder can actually do while the situation settles. As of publication, the reported details cover the restart and Kraken's restriction; the full scope of the exploit had not been detailed in the primary source.
